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A * 9 ! OF Tff>^ 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
UTAHAPPELUTECOURTJ 
SEP 2 5 2009 
RAYMOND A HINTZE 
Chief Deputy Protecting Utah • Protecting You 
KIRK TORGENSEN 
Chief Deputy 
September 24, 2009 
Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Re: State v. Hurt, 20080662-CA 
Utah R. App. P. 24Q) 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
In preparing for oral argument in this case, counsel discovered that the Ninth Circuit 
recently issued the following case: United States v. Gonzalez, F.3d , 2009 WL 
2581738,09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10,840. In Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit held that the search 
of Gonzalez's vehicle, conducted under the then-prevailing interpretation of New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), but rendered unconstitutional by Arizona v. Gant, U.S. , 
129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), could not be upheld under the good faith exception to the warrant 
requirement. Gonzalez thus conflicts with the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. 
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009), which the State cited to the Court in a previous 
letter. 
Oral argument is set for Monday, 28 September 2009. 
Sincerely, 
ARIAN DECKER 
ssistant Attorney General 
copy: Dana M. Facemyer 
Westlaw. 
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H 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Ricardo GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 07-30098. 
Aug. 24, 2009. 
Background: Defendant was convicted in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Washington, Edward F. Shea, J., of possession of 
firearm and ammunition by prohibited person. 
Holding: Following remand, 129 S.Ct. 2156, the 
Court of Appeals, 
Fletcher, Circuit Judge, held that search of defend-
ant's vehicle, conducted under then-prevailing inter-
pretation of Supreme Court ruling in New York v. 
Belton, but rendered unconstitutional by subsequent 
Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Gant, was not 
in good faith. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Courts €^100(1) 
106kl00(l) Most Cited Cases 
[1] Criminal Law €^>394.4(3) 
110k394.4(3) Most Cited Cases 
Search of defendant's vehicle, conducted under 
then-prevailing interpretation of Supreme Court rul-
ing in New York v. Bel ton as permitting warrantless 
vehicle search incident to arrest of occupant of the 
vehicle, but rendered unconstitutional by sub-
sequent Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Gant, 
which read Belton more narrowly and was an-
nounced while defendant's conviction was on direct 
review, was not in good faith, and exclusionary rule 
thus applied. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[2] Courts €^>100(1) 
106kl00(l) Most Cited Cases 
Failure to apply a newly declared constitutional 
rule to criminal cases pending on direct review vi-
olates basic norms of constitutional adjudication. 
Rebecca L. Pennell, Federal Defenders of Eastern 
Washington and Idaho, Yakima, WA, for the de-
fendant-appellant. 
James A. McDevitt, United States Attorney, and 
Thomas J. Hanlon (argued), Assistant United States 
Attorney, Yakima, WA, for the plaintiff-appellee. 
On Remand from the United States Supreme Court. 
D.C.NO.CR-06-02112-EFS. 
Before BETTY B. FLETCHER, RICHARD A. 
PAEZ and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges. 
B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 
We review this appeal for the second time on re-
mand from the United States Supreme Court. The 
Court on May 4, 2009 granted certiorari, and va-
cated and remanded our disposition for further con-
sideration in light of its recent decision in Arizona 
v. Gant, — U.S. — , 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 
485 (2009). We hold that Gant requires that Appel-
lant Ricardo Gonzalez's motion to suppress be gran-
ted and, therefore, Gonzalez's conviction be re-
versed. 
Gonzalez had previously been convicted of Posses-
sion of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Prohibited 
Person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
Gonzalez's conviction resulted from a firearm 
found during a June 19, 2006 traffic stop of a car in 
which Gonzalez was riding. The police, following 
the arrest of another passenger for out-standing 
warrants, searched the passenger compartment of 
the car and discovered a loaded 9 millimeter Ber-
etta firearm inside the glovebox. Gonzalez filed a 
motion to suppress, asserting the search of the car 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights, which the 
district court denied. Following his conviction on 
November 28, 2006, Gonzalez appealed his convic-
tion and sentence, asserting in part that the denial 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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(Publication page references are not available for this 
of his motion to suppress was in error. We affirmed 
the district court on all aspects of the appeal. 
United States v. Gonzalez, 290 Fed.Appx. 51 (9th 
Cir.2008). Our ruling affirming denial of the mo-
tion to suppress rested on the Supreme Court's 
holding in New York v. Bel ton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 
101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), which has 
been read by our court as permitting a warrantless 
vehicle search incident to the arrest of an occupant 
of the vehicle. Gonzalez, 290 Fed.Appx. at 52; see 
United States v. Weaver, 433 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th 
Cir.2006) ("Applying the Belton rule, we have held 
that a warrantless automobile search will be valid if 
it is 'roughly contemporaneous with the arrest.'"). 
[1] In Gant, the Court affirmed the Arizona Su-
preme Court's holding that the broad reading of 
Belton by our and other courts was error. Reading 
Belton more narrowly, the Court announced as the 
rule for vehicle searches incident to arrest: "Police 
may search a vehicle incident to a recent occu-
pant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reach-
ing distance of the passenger compartment at the 
time of the search or it is reasonable to believe 
the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of ar-
rest. When these justifications are absent, a 
search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreason-
able unless police obtain a warrant or show that 
another exception lo the warrant requirement 
applies." Gant, 129 S.Ct at 1723-24. The Govern-
ment concedes that, under the Supreme Court's cur-
rent reading of Belton stated in Gant, the search of 
Gonzalez's vehicle was improper because Gonzalez 
was handcuffed and secured in a patrol vehicle at 
the time of the search of the vehicle. However, the 
Government asserts nonetheless that the search was 
in good faith under the then-prevailing interpreta-
tion of Belton and that, therefore, the exclusionary 
rule should not be applied. 
The Government's assertion is not directly suppor-
ted by our current case law. The Government relies 
on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Herring 
v. United States, --- U.S. — , 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 
L.Ed.2d 496 (2009), which applied the good faith 
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tment) 
exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), in holding 
that whether the exclusionary rule should be ap-
plied to a search in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment "turns on the culpability of the police and the 
potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police con-
duct." Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 698. Neither the Su-
preme Court nor our court, however, has applied 
the good faith exception to the scenario we face: a 
search conducted under a then-prevailing interpret-
ation of a Supreme Court ruling, but rendered un-
constitutional by a subsequent Supreme Court rul-
ing announced while the defendant's conviction was 
on direct review. The cases the Government relies 
on involve application of the good faith exception 
to searches conducted in reliance on a warrant held 
invalid following the search; see, e.g., Herring 129 
S.Ct. at 698; or a statute or regulation subsequently 
found unconstitutional during direct review of the 
defendant's conviction; see, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 
480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 
(1987); United States v. Peltier, All U.S. 531, 95 
S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975); United States v. 
Meek, 366 F.3d 705 (9th Cir.2004). 
We conclude, however, that this case should be 
controlled by long-standing precedent governing 
the applicability of a new rule announced by the 
Supreme Court while a case is on direct review. 
The Court has held that "a decision of this Court 
construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied 
retroactively to all convictions that were not yet fi-
nal at the time the decision was rendered." United 
States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562, 102 S.Ct. 
2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982); see Griffith v. Ken-
tucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 
649 (1987) (finding that even decisions constituting 
a "clear break" with past precedent have retroactive 
application). This precedent requires us to apply 
Gant to the current case without the overlay of an 
application of the good faith exception. To hold 
that Gant may not be fully applied here, as the 
Government urges, would conflict with the Court's 
retroactivity precedents. 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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[2] Such a ruling would undermine the rationale of 
Johnson and Griffith. As stated in Griffith, "failure 
to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to 
criminal cases pending on direct review violates ba-
sic norms of constitutional adjudication." 479 U.S. 
at 314, 107 S.Ct. 708. It would violate "the integrity 
of judicial review" by turning the court into, in ef-
fect, a legislative body announcing new rules but 
not applying them, rather than acting in our proper 
role as an adjudicative body deciding cases. It also 
would "violate[ ] the principle of treating similarly 
situated defendants the same" by allowing only one 
defendant to be the beneficiary of a newly an-
nounced rule. Id. at 322-23, 107 S.Ct. 708. In Gant, 
the Supreme Court upheld in full the decision of the 
Arizona Supreme Court, which not only found the 
search at issue unconstitutional, but ordered the 
suppression of the evidence found as a result of the 
unconstitutional search. See Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 
1724; State v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640, 646 
(2007). Hence, refusal to allow Gonzalez similarly 
to benefit from the Court's ruling in Gant through 
application of the exclusionary rule would implic-
ate the same concerns mandating the Court's hold-
ing in Griffith. [FN1] 
Because both Johnson and Griffith remain binding 
precedent, we cannot apply the good faith excep-
tion here without creating an untenable tension 
within existing Supreme Court law. We, therefore, 
hold that evidence derived from the search at issue 
must be suppressed and reverse Gonzalez's convic-
tion. [FN2] 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
FN1. We are concerned here with the 
Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant. 
We do not consider whether the police of-
ficers are entitled to qualified immunity in 
a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action. 
FN2. To the extent that our opinion con-
flicts with our previous holding in United 
States v. Osife, 398 F.3d 1143 (9th 
Cir.2005), we decline to follow Osife in 
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light of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gant See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 
900 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that "a three-
judge panel of this court and district courts 
should consider themselves bound by the 
intervening higher authority and reject the 
prior opinion of this court as having been 
effectively overruled"). 
— F.3d — , 09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 10,840 
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